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As conversation analysis forges new directions, it also faces significant 
challenges in a world of developing research, and shifting research inter-
ests. My purpose in this chapter is to address one of these challenges: to 
define more explicitly the elements of a framework that will license and 
constrain the observed structures of social interaction, and in turn their 
proper analysis. Part of the goal is to offer an account of human interac-
tion that is general enough to address broader, interdisciplinary questions 
of the study of human behavior. 
I aim to explicate a theoretical foundation for understanding the kinds 
of phenomena dealt with in the above chapters - that is, the negotiation of 
knowledge, responsibility and affiliation in interaction - building on four 
related concepts: enchrony, status, knowledge and agency. Each builds from 
the next, where enchrony entails accountability, status relativizes it, knowl-
edge grounds it, and agency distributes it. Each is a source of asymmetry, 
and each thereby plays a role in defining a possibility space in the morality 
of knowledge in communication. The four concepts are well established in 
existing literature, although they may be known by other names, and may 
not have been brought together in quite the same way as here. 
Enchrony 
Our first element is a primal driving force for the ever-forward progres-
sion of social interaction, a force from which we derive sequence (Schegloff 
2007b), from its simplest to its most complex manifestations. 
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Because human interaction is a form of animal communication, we may 
start with the simple observation that communicative interaction involves 
formally ritualized patterns of behavior, which bring about relatively pre-
dictable effects on others in the social realm (Krebs and Dawkins 1984). 
This conception of social interaction entails a dynamic relation between a 
communicative action and the response it elicits. And, in tum, such a reac-
tion may in itself be a communicative action, engendering, in response, a 
further communicative action (see below). Moreover, any sequence "com-
municative action and subsequent response" is a unit, not a conjunct. 
The sequence cannot be derived from independently established concepts 
"communicative action" and "response." This is because neither may be 
defined without the other. The relation between communicative action and 
response is critical to defining them both. We may speak of a communica-
tive action in isolation only if we bracket out the notion of response (and 
vice versa), because in fact a communicative action can only be known to 
be a communicative action insofar as it is known to elicit a relatively pre-
dictable or motivated response. I 
"Response" here is not the highly constrained notion captured by 
"answer" (e.g., to a question). It has a more general sense, i.e., that which 
follows and is occasioned by, and relevant to, something prior. Consider 
the B lines in the following service encounters (examples from Merritt 
[1976: 325, 333 and 331, respectively]): 
(1) 
A: Do you have coffee to go? 
B: Cream and sugar? starts to pour coffee 
A: What'lI ya have girls? 
B: What's the soup of the day? 
A: Do you sell key chains? 
B: What? 
The B turns do not directly address the ostensive content of the questions 
that precede them, though each is a response in the sense intended here. In 
different ways, each is directly relevant to, and occasioned by, what came 
just before it. 
I Human communicative actions do not merely cause their responses to occur as heat causes 
ice to melt. This is because responses are oriented not only to the perceptible signs out of 
which communicative actions are formed, but also to what those communicative actions 
mean or "stand for" (Kockelman 2005; Peirce 1955). A response to some physical event like 
an action is what Peirce called an interpretant. An interpretant makes sense in terms of the 
sign's object, i.e., what the sign stands for. 
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Once our concept of communication incorporates this fundamental 
dynamic semiotic process - sign2 and response - notice what results when 
we see that the response is typically also a communicative action itself. 
Each communicative action simultaneously occupies a backward-looking 
status as "that which responds to what just happened" and a forward-
looking status as "that which elicits a response next." Responses to com-
municative actions are new communicative actions, and they engender 
new responses, in turn. I refer to the local relation between a sign and its 
response as relevance (cf. Sperber and Wilson 1995). Because a response 
may be a sign in itself, which may beget a new response, we can derive a 
potentially unbounded sequence of such pivoting sign-response relations. 
I refer to this forward-feeding temporal, causal-conditional trajectory of 
relevance relations as enchrony (Enfield 2009: 10). 
Why introduce a new term if we already have adequate analytic concepts 
and terms such as sequence, adjacency, nextness, contiguity and progres-
sivity (Schegloff 2007b: 14)? A first reason is that each of these existing 
terms denotes something narrower than what I want to denote by the term 
"enchrony." Enchrony does not replace those terms or concepts. It refers 
to a more general force that underlies their emergence. A second reason for 
the term is to draw attention to this family of notions under a single rubric, 
and to place the rubric within a broader, interdisciplinary set of alternative 
perspectives for the analysis of human communication. An enchronic per-
spective on human communication focuses on sequences of interlocking or 
interdependent communicative moves that are taken to be co-relevant, and 
causally-conditionally related. Enchrony is a level of temporal-causal grain 
(typically, "conversational time") that an analyst of communication can 
adopt, as distinct from other possible perspectives, fitted to other purposes, 
that focus on other temporal scales and other kinds of causal-conditional 
process; these include phylogenetic, diachronic, ontogenetic, epigenetic 
and synchronic perspectives. 
An enchronic perspective is grounded in trajectories of co-relevant 
actions, a phenomenon observed by scholars of social action from Schutz 
2 For convenience, I shall sometimes use the word "sign" to refer to a communicative action. 
though the terms "sign" and "action" are not synonymous. While all commUnicative 
actions are built out of signs, not all signs are commUniCative actions. Like ot~er students 
of social interaction I am interested in how communicative actions can be recognized by 
those who perceive them. and in turn how these actions should therefore be formulated (by 
those who produce them) in order to secure thiS recognitIOn. The only kmd of theoT) that 
can account for how social actions are recognized is a semiotic theory (e.g .. Kockelman 
2005, 2006b) - that is, a theory that defines the means by which people can use perceptions 
of their environment as cues for making inferences to what IS not directly observable (e.g .. 
others' apparent motivations and goals). 
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and Mead to Goffman and Garfinkel, to Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, to 
Heritage, Drew and many others since. A communicative action or move 
(Goffman 1981) has what Schutz (1970) referred to as "because motives" 
(what gave rise to the move, what occasioned it) and "in-order-to motives" 
(the goals of the move, what it hopes to bring about): I'm pouring a 
drink because I'm thirsty, and in order to drink it. The move is a step in a 
sequence of events where each such step interlocks relevantly and coher-
ently both with something that just happened (or that otherwise already 
applied in the context of the move) and with something that happens next. 
This Peircean conception of meaning as inherently dynamic is distinctly 
unlike the static Saussurean version (Enfield 2009; Kockelman 2005), and 
it is the one that is best understood by analysts of tape-recorded sequences 
of human interaction since the likes of Sacks (e.g., 1992: I, 3-11) and 
Schegloff (e.g., 1968). 
Communicative actions in enchronic sequences are hooked together in 
a special way. They do not randomly follow one another. As both analysts 
and participants, we incorrigibly take enchrony to be operative, and we go 
to great lengths to interpret actions as connected by relevance, even when 
there is no such relation. As Garfinkel advises, people will always under-
stand your actions, just not always in the way you intended. A vivid dem-
onstration comes from a 1960s experiment conducted in the Department 
of Psychiatry at UCLA (Garfinkel 1967: ch. 3). Subjects were asked to 
take part in a new form of therapy where. they would pose their problems 
as a series of questions, to which the counselor's answers could only be 
"yes" or "no." Unbeknownst to subjects, the series of "yes" and "no" 
responses that they received from their unseen "counselor" were randomly 
predetermined. Whether an answer was "yes" or "no" had no relation to 
the question being posed. Yet all the subjects perceived the responses "as 
answers to their questions" (Garfinkel 1967: 89). I cannot do justice here 
to Garfinkel's rich discussion of the findings regarding this notion of an 
incorrigible projection of relevance (see his pp. 89-94), but I simply note 
here the tremendous strength of an enchronic stance adopted in everyday 
life. It shows up, for instance, in globally attested practices of divination, 
in which essentially random events - such as whether a ritual spider walks 
to the left or to the right when released from its lair - are interpreted as 
properly responsive to questions posed (Goody 1995; Levi-Strauss 1966; 
Zeitlyn 1995). 
This glue or hook between adjacent moves can be characterized as a pair 
of arrows, one pointing forward from A to B, one back from B to A (Figure 
12.1). These are the two faces of relevance: effectiveness and appropriate-
ness. The forward-pointing arrow represents the effectiveness of A, that is, 
the sense in which the sign A gives rise to B as an interpretant or relevant 








respons~. The back~ard-~ointing arrow represents the appropriateness of 
B, that IS, the sense III whIch B is "fitting" as a next action from A.3 Now 
t~e following point i~ critical to the rest of this chapter's argument: effec~ 
tlveness and approprzateness are normative notions. Our attention is only 
drawn to them when there are violations. The more likely B is to elicit 
surprise or sancUon,4 the less appropriate it is to A, and the less effective A 
has been in eliciting a response. 
Here is an example from Schegloff (1992: 1310): 
(2) 
1 ROG: It's always this uhm image of who 1 am 
2 'n what 1 want people to think 1 am. 
3 (0.2) 
4 DAN: And somehow it's unrelated to what's going on 
5 at the moment? 
6 ROG: Yeah. But t(h)ell me is everybody like that or 
7 am Ijust out of [it. 
8 KEN: [1- Not to change the subject 
3 There is a second-order sense in which the arrows can go in the other direction. As John 
Heritage points out (pers. comm.), a responsive move can have an effect upon the prior 
move by "retrospectively" determining which action the prior move is performing. Note, 
however, that it does this by exploiting the backward-looking relation of appropriateness: 
if turn 1 is ambiguous between meanings X and Y (say. an observation versus a complaint 
e.g., The trash hasn't been taken out), then turn 2, by being an appropriate response to Y 
but not X, is then able to "determine the meaning" of turn I (as long as it is allowed to go 
through, without correction). Paul Drew points out (pers. comm.) that when people make 
"pre's" to offers or invitations, this is an opportunity for a response to "make" the pre itself 
into an offer, and, if this is not forthcoming, we can say it never was one. But this is not the 
same sense of effectiveness as intended here, that is, the sense in which turn I is what causes 
or occasions or gives rise to turn 2 taking place at all. 
4 I am not speaking of surprise or sanction at the content of what is communicated per se, 
but at the relation of relevance or appropriateness to what is being responded to. And note 
also that "what is being responded to" can cover not just prior communicative actions such 
as a question that precedes an answer, but also other types of signs such as (pre-)existing 
states of affairs, like the physical structure of a grocer's store and the receptive stance of the 
shopkeeper that "precede" the possibility of a customer stating what he wants to buy. 
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9 but-
10 ROG: Well don't change (the subject. Answer me. 
11 KEN: [No I mea- I'm on the subject. 
12 I'm on the subject. But- 1- I mean "not to 
13 interrupt you but-" uh a lotta times I'm sitting 
14 in class, I'll start - uh I could be listening .. 
In lines 6 and 7 Roger asks, "But tell me is everybody like that or am Ijust 
out of it?". This sets up a strong normative expectation that an answer 
be provided next, and when this is apparently not forthcoming - i.e., 
when the norm is violated - in lines 8 and 9, Roger is within his rights to 
sanction Ken and demand his entitlement to be answered, as seen in line 
10. Ken's subsequent response shows that he also acknowledges Roger's 
entitlement. 
Of course, surprise and sanction are measurable in degrees. Suppose 
John asks Paul Is that a martini you're drinking? If Paul's response is No, 
this will run against a preference for confirmation (Heritage 1984b), thus 
departing in one sense from what is preferred or "expected."5 But at the 
same time a "No" answer conforms precisely with an "expectation" that 
the addressee will respond to the question by giving the information that 
was asked for. A "No" answer may be mildly inapposite, but would not be 
as readily sanctionable as, say, if the addressee were to ignore the question 
and remain silent where response had been due; here, Hey I asked you a 
question would be a justified pursuit of- the normative target by way of 
sanction - see the example just above. The possibility space for degrees 
and kinds of surprise and sanction is a complex one (Schegloff and Sacks 
1973). The normative expression of sanction and surprise helps to regi-
ment and qualify the ever-present properties of appropriateness and effec-
tiveness that are inherent in chains of relevance. The inherently normative 
nature of an enchronic system means that we cannot begin to examine 
human communication without entering a realm of morally governed 
social behavior. 
To summarize: enchrony is grounded in relevance, from which we ulti-
mately derive not only sequence (in the enriched sense of Schegloff [1968, 
2007b]), but also a bedrock of public, norm-governed accountability for 
each increment in a communicative sequence. The notions of effective-
ness and appropriateness, defined as they are by "expectation" and the 
surprise or sanction that may result from transgression of this expecta-
tion, take social interaction and transform it into a morally charged affair. 
For all social creatures, a poorly formed or poorly chosen move may be 
5 By using the term "expected," I do not want to imply that a response must be actively 
anticipated. It is not so much that one expects a particular response, rather that one does 
not expect the alternatives. 
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ineffective, but only among humans can such a mismatch lead to moral 
sanction. Inappropriate responses draw attention, and are accountable. 
This accountability is natural given the fundamentally cooperative nature 
of human social life (Axelrod 1984; Boyd and Richerson 2006). Our 
instincts for moral policing, including punishment, form an indispensa-
ble part of maintaining the viability of a cooperative bias in large social 
groups (Henrich et al. 2004; Boyd and Richerson 2005). Not surprisingly, 
these instincts for moral monitoring and sanction are well expressed in 
communicative practice. 
I have described enchrony as a core driving force in the interpretation 
and production of communicative actions. With it, we derive central 
structural properties of interaction such as sequence, adjacency, nextness, 
contiguity and progressivity, well known and described in conversation 
analysis but barely comprehended in linguistics. We see the lamination 
of normative reasoning onto this structural trajectory: departures may 
draw not only surprise at not having been anticipated, but also implicit or 
explicit sanction for not having been regarded as appropriate. But while 
enchrony is clearly part of the foundational undercarriage of interaction, 
it cannot single-handedly account for the phenomena explored in this 
book. The mechanism of enchrony is a general one. What I have proposed 
so far does not yet explain how this general mechanism is relativized to 
different contexts, such that a certain type of response may be appropriate 
in one situation but not in another. Clearly, what counts as appropriate 
and effective must be defined relative to elements of the situation, includ-
ing facts about the people involved in the interaction, as well as the dif-
ferent cultural settings in which interactions take place. To address this, 
we now build on the idea of enchrony by using it to develop a notion of 
status. 
Status 
The second piece of the argument hinges on the concept of status. The 
word "status" is used here in a technical sense, derived from Linton (1936), 
and fleshed out in recent work by Kockelman (2006b). It will never be used 
in this chapter to mean prestige or "high status." Status here is akin to 
the notion of membership category used in ethnomethodology and con-
versation analysis (Sacks 1972a, b, 1992; cf. Schegloff 2007b).6 A person's 
status is defined here as a collection of his entitlements (or rights) and 
responsibilities (or duties) at a given moment, relative to other members of 
6 This notion of status does not imply that a social category is immutable or in some other 
sense not contestable or negotiable. 
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his social group. We can characterize these entitlements and responsibili-
ties in terms of enchrony and its elements, as introduced in the previous 
section, without introducing new analytical machinery. The concepts of 
entitlement and responsibility are defined straightforwardly through the 
relations of appropriateness and effectiveness that hold for any commu-
nicative actions in enchronic sequence. A person's status is functionally 
no different from a sign that precedes or co-occurs with a piece of their 
behavior,? where the fit between the status and the behavior can be assessed 
for its relevance. The behavior will have a degree of appropriateness or 
effectiveness, as measured for instance by the degree of normatively justi-
fied surprise or sanction in response. 
If John is a university lecturer, we can say that this is a status because it 
may be characterized as a set of entitlements and responsibilities regarding 
his social relations with certain other people in certain communicative con-
texts. While inhabiting or enacting this status, he will have rights and duties 
in relation to his behavior toward his students. Were he to invite one such 
student out for cocktails, this might attract surprise and possible sanction, 
while the same invitation among the same two people would be unremark-
able if the lecturer-student relation did not apply. As long as his status as 
a lecturer is in the common ground of an interaction (and is "activated" 
in the relevant sense, i.e., that he is relating as a lecturer to his interlocu-
tor), the relation of relevance that holds between his status and a piece of 
his behavior is functionally the same as ,a relation between two signs or 
communicative actions in sequence. The appropriateness of his behavior 
is judged in terms of its fit or relevance given his status. Correspondingly, 
the effectiveness of his status is measured in terms of its fit to the behavior 
he produces (see Garfinkel [1967: ch. 4] for a rich exploration of this issue 
with reference to gender). 
As Linton put it, status is polar or relational, thus not to be understood 
in terms of intrinsic properties ascribable to a person as an individual, but 
defined in terms of how that person behaves in relation to others. So, to 
say that Mary inhabits the status of mother is not to say something about 
the isolated qualities of Mary. It is to say that she behaves and responds 
in ways that are appropriate to being in the relation of mother to someone 
(her children). Status is a set of publicly norm-guided expectations as to 
how a person will or should behave. 
7 This is where we need the notion of "sign" as a higher-level category which subsumes 
communicative actions, among other things. My status is signified in various ways - for 
example, by the clothes I am wearing - but we do not want to say that by merely putting 
on these clothes I am performing a communicative action in the normal sense of that term 
(i.e., a move in a sequence of interaction). 
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Ryle (1949: 45) described status as an "assemblage of performances," 
a set of possIble actions, or dispositions, that, when filtered through rel-
evance and norms, become entitlements and responsibilities.s 
A drunkard at the chessboard makes the one move which upsets his opponent's 
plan of campaign. The spectators are satisfied that this was not due to clever-
ness but to luck, if they are satisfied that most of his moves made in this state 
break the rules of chess, or have no tactical connexion with the position of the 
game, that he would not be likely to repeat this move if the tactical situation 
were to recur, that he would not applaud such a move made by another player in 
a similar situation, that he could not explain why he had done it or even describe 
the threat under which his King had been. (Ryle 1949: 45) 
Our entitlements (what we may do) and responsibilities (what we must do) 
are captured under Ryle's general notion of dispositions. I suggest that 
there is a third category of dispositions that may be termed enablements, 
that is, things one can do. If entitlements are what we are allowed to do 
(e.g., a mother will typically be allowed more immediate access to her 
child's body than other adults), enablements are what we are capable of 
doing (e.g., a mother will typically be capable of predicting the preferences 
and reactions of her own child better than others can). The measure of 
entitlement is the degree to which surprise or sanction at carrying out the 
action is normatively justified. The measure of enablement is the degree to 
which one is capable of carrying it out at all, regardless of how it will be 
treated by social others. 
Through entitlement and enablement we can articulate a fundamental 
distinction between claiming and demonstrating. (See Heritage [2007: 255] 
and his discussion of Sacks 1992: II, 141.) If r want to claim that I am a 
marksman I can use mere words to do it, or even words supported by a 
lucky shot. But to demonstrate that I am a marksman I have to produce an 
assemblage of performances that would not be possible were the claim not 
true. To the extent that inhabiting a status can be determined by isolated 
definitive facts (e.g., Mary is John's mother because she gave birth to him), 
it may constitute a mere claim to the total assemblage of performances 
that may come under the relevant culturally developed notion of the status 
"mother to." Thus, we might cite Mary's inability to produce this broader 
range of performances (e.g., failure to accurately predict the behavior of 
her child, when a nanny has more success in doing so) as evidence that she 
is a poor example of a mother (in one sense). This would be a case of mis-
match between enablements and entitlements. It is a gap between the claim 
derived from her "official" authority (she gave birth to him so this makes 
8 The point was amply elaborated some twenty years later in the work of Sacks (1972a. b) on 
"membership categorization devices" (Schegloff 2007b). 
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her his mother} and the demonstration enabled by her "actual" authority. 
(Below, I will define "official" and "actual" authority as status-based and 
source-based, respectively.) This is a difference between the two forms of 
status that Linton called ascribed (mother, brother, etc.) versus achieved 
(friend, enemy, etc.). 
It appears that in the business of maintaining statuses - a desperate 
pursuit that dominates our social lives - it is not enough merely to possess 
enablements and entitlements. One must exercise these as a way of dem-
onstrating that one has them (and has earned them), both by proving with 
action that one is capable of carrying them out (not possible in the case of 
the "bad" mother who cannot reliably predict her child's behavior) and by 
showing that, having carried them out, no sanction by another is justified 
(e.g., by disciplining the child for misbehaving, knowing that she cannot 
rightfully be criticized by others for doing so). 
For example, if we are to say that Mary and Jane are close friends, 
then they have certain entitlements and responsibilities in relation to one 
another. Their behavior with regard to one another may be judged as more 
or less effective of, or appropriate to, their status as close friends. Thus, if 
Jane talks to Mary about her personal troubles, this should cause no sur-
prise and would not be justifiably sanctioned (in contrast, say, to when Jane 
starts telling her personal troubles to a stranger on the subway). Or if Jane 
asks Mary for a loan of $100, this is likely to be effective, and would not 
be inappropriate for close friends. It may, however, be both ineffective and 
sanctionable in the context of more distant kinds of personal relationship. 
If Jane and Mary are already (known to be) close friends, then behaviors 
of the kind just described will be judged as appropriate, and will not justifi-
ably elicit surprise. But, supposing they were not close friends, to behave as 
if they were could be effective of (or constitutive of) that status, i.e., could 
be a way of creating that status.9 
Status is a powerful notion because it defines human relations at many 
levels of grain and in many types of frame. Statuses run from professional 
relations like doctor to patient or experimenter to experimental subject, 
to kin relations like older brother to younger brother or grandmother to 
grandson, to interpersonally achieved relations like best friend to best 
friend or acquaintance to acquaintance, and finally to context- or experi-
ence-defined relations like expert to novice or competitor to competitor. It 
includes the broadest imaginable range of human types, including ad hoc 
categories (such as "people you can turn to" [Sacks 1992]). 
9 See Pomerantz and Mandelbaum (2005) for a review of practices through which people 
can "enact incumbency" in types of close social relations. 
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Of special interest in the rest of this chapter, and in much of this book, 
is interactants' status relative to each other as complementary participants 
in roles like speaker (to hearer), or overhearer (to others in a conversation). 
Recall the example above where we saw that Ken's not answering a ques-
tion was an accountable failure. That kind of accountability was described 
in terms of the elements of enchrony: effectiveness and appropriateness. 
Having introduced the notion of status, we now see that this accountability 
is relativized. It matters who answers the question. If I address you, then 
it is you who should respond, because it is you who occupies the status of 
"addressee of the question" (Stivers and Robinson 2006). While another 
person may well know the answer and be able to respond, possibly on your 
behalf, this other person does not occupy the same status as recipient of 
the question. Here we see the relevance relation being relativized to dif-
ferent participants through differences in status. This is illustrated in the 
following example from Stivers and Rossano (2010): 
Reina asks Tamaryn whether her boyfriend's mother calls to talk to her on the 
phone [line 1]. Tamaryn fails to answer the question in the course of the follow-
ing 1.0 second [line 2], but at that point co-present Sandra quips "No thated) 
(,11) be wastin' minutes." (line 3). 
(3) (Stivers and Rossano 2010) 
I 
2 
[«R gazing in Ts direction: T off camera» 










REI: ==> (>Ta- I want Tamaryn tuh answer the damn question.< Don't 





[O(kay) [I'm sorry. 
((leaning towards Sandra» Oh no it's okay. 
She called once to see if my mother had thrown a 
fit but no: other than thaC 
Although Sandra's response is formally typ~ matched (Schegloff and Sacks 
1973) and type-conforming (Raymond 2003) It IS nonethel~ss tr~ated as faIlIng. 
Reina both indirectly sanctions Tamaryn for not answenng (mdlrect only m 
that the tum is nominally addressed to Sandra): "> Ta- I want Tamar~n tuh 
answer the damn question.<" and directly sanctions Sandra f~r a~swenng on 
Tamaryn's behalf: "Don't answer for her" (lines 6-7). ThIS sanctJO~mg elICIts an 
apology from Sandra and. ultimately, an answer from Tamaryn (hnes 10 -II). 
Status casts our behavior in the constant light of a measure of appropri-
ateness or fit: knowing this person's current status (th~t is, the sta~us that 
is presently activated), how appropriate is her behaVIOr? Or: seemg her 
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current behavior, presuming (as, by default, I will) that it is appropriate 
behavior, what does this tell me of her status?1O As Sacks (1992) notes, any 
instance of "category-bound activity" contributes to our further under-
standing of, and expectations of, the relevant social statuses. 
In this section, I have introduced status as an analytic notion that puts 
meat on the bones of enchrony. Status provides a mechanism for giving 
values to the variables of appropriateness and effectiveness, and relativ-
izing these across different types of social relation and cultural setting. 
Both enchrony and status are sources of asymmetry in communication. 
From enchrony, there is asymmetry in precedence relations and in the 
associated one-way notion of response. From status, there is an une-
qualness of social relations, readily seen in relationships like father-son, 
shopkeeper-customer or speaker-hearer. There now remains a third source 
of asymmetry in communication that will account for a further crucial 
aspect of the problem explored in this book - the distributed nature of 
responsibility and commitment concerning knowledge and information 
in communication. We tum now to the issue of knowledge, in relation to 
the semantic and pragmatic content of propositions. This will require the 
concept of status, already introduced, and must be fleshed out before we 
move on to the final piece of the argument, agency. 
Propositions and the relativity of knowledge 
Human communication, through language, differs from other forms of 
animal communication in that it can involve the encoding and exchange of 
propositions. While the informational properties of propositions are not 
typically a matter of discussion in research on the structures of conversa-
tion, they are presupposed. The step into research on matters surrounding 
knowledge and certainty requires us to have an account of just what it 
is that propositions encode. We therefore need to address propositional 
content if we are to have a theory of how asymmetries in knowledge are 
navigated in social interaction. 
In order to pursue our primary interest here - the meanings of social 
actions in interaction - it is necessary to examine the properties of one of 
the most common elements of action formulation: the linguistically encoded 
10 We can tell whether two people are friends or strangers from their behavior toward each 
other; such inferences from social behavior are the basis of Hinde's (1976) account of 
how the ethnographer ultimately discerns higher-level social structure; see also Dunbar 
(1988), Enfield (2006). An illustrative case is that of Princess Margaret, who, in a fleeting 
moment at Queen Elizabeth's coronation in June 1953, revealed the intimacy of her rela-
tionship to Group Captain Peter Townsend by leaning over to brush a piece of fluff from 
his uniform. Through what it showed about the social relation at hand, this little act had 
big consequences. 
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prop~sition (see Lyons 1977). A proposition refers to some entity, and 
predicates some state of affairs (e.g., a property or event) about that entity. 
An example is the proposition "She called once" , encoded in the utterance 
~roduced by Tamaryn in line 10 of the above example. In this proposi-
tion, the entity is "she" (referring to the speaker's boyfriend's mother) and 
the state of affairs is "to have called once." If we know who "she" is and 
we understand the meaning of the expression "to have called once," then 
we are in a position to judge the applicability (say, truth or falsity) of the 
predication to a particular instance. If we understand the meaning of the 
proposition, then we are able to cite possible reasons the state of affairs 
holds, and we are able to make inferences from this state of affairs to other 
propositions. This is, of course, not an account of utterance meaning or 
action formulation, but it is a necessary part of such an account. 
This introduces a triadic relation between a topical entity, a predicated 
state of affairs, and a person who may judge the applicability of the rela-
tion between the first two. We may refer to a person's capacity to make 
this judgement - measurable by their capacity to attest to the truth of, to 
give reasons for, and to make inferences from the proposition as under-
stood - as their knowledge. We can imagine a gradient of possible states of 
knowledge between knowing for sure (e.g., I know she called once because 
I took the call myself) and having no idea. Perhaps I overheard Tamaryn 
on the phone to somebody who I figured was the boyfriend's mother, but 
couldn't be sure. 
A knowledge state is like a status in that it is causally-conditionally related 
to its causes and effects, and is measured by the behavior that it makes pos-
sible. As argued by ordinary language philosophers like Ryle (1949), it is 
not so much an issue of my mental state of knowing something to be true. 
What matters is how I can demonstrate this knowledge through observable 
action, specifically by giving reasons (my evidence for the truth of the state 
of affairs, what caused the knowledge, the source of the knowledge) and 
by making inferences to consequences (what the knowledge enables, what 
performances are made possible by the state of affairs). I am proposing 
that knowledge of the truth of a proposition is no different from other 
status-related dispositions, displayed and demonstrated through an assem-
blage of performances, like any other kind of status. This is in line with an 
"inferentialist" view of meaning (Brandom 1994, 2000; Kockelman 2005. 
2006a, b), which states that to know the meaning of a pro~ositio~ is to 
be able to engage in norm-governed practices of reasoning III relatIOn to 
that proposition. Such reasoning is simply an ass~mbl~ge of perfo,rmances 
that demonstrates some aspect of one's status - III thiS case. one s proper 
understanding of the sentence's meaning. of its veracity and applicabili~y 
in relation to a particular state of affairs. We have to presuppose that, III 
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the context of Tamaryn's utterance in line 10 of the example above, the 
participants can and do draw on a capacity to judge the veracity of propo-
sitions like "She called once". 
What is the relevance of all of this to social interaction? Well, among our 
most common tools for the formulation of social actions are propositions 
encoded in language, and it is here that we find ourselves navigating the 
rocky shoals of asymmetries in knowledge. If I know something, then I 
can or must commit to the consequences of that knowledge. Consequences 
include inferences that can or must be made. If I know about something, 
then I can say things about iLl I This is how one demonstrates understand-
ing rather than merely claiming it, as shown by line 3 of the following 
example, constructed by Sacks (1992) and discussed by Heritage (2007): 
(4) 
I A: Where are you staying? 
2 B: Pacific Palisades 
3 A: Oh at the west side of town 
Here, Speaker A demonstrates that among his enablements is the ability 
to correctly deploy a proposition about Pacific Palisades to state that it is 
found on the west side of the city of Los Angeles. This attests to his knowl-
edge. The key about demonstrating is that it is an honest signal, while mere 
claiming is not. As Sacks points out, were the speaker to reply in line 3 
"Oh, Pacific Palisades", no demonstration of understanding will have been 
made. One could say it even when one has no idea where Pacific Palisades 
is. Here is an example in which a speaker merely claims rather than defini-
tively demonstrates their understanding (from Sacks 1992: II, 141): 
(5) 
. I A: Now you told me you eh-uh-where are you.=Are you at uh:Puh-ih: (-) Palos 
uh:(O.4) 
2 B: eh-No in ah:::::uh: (-) t Marina del Rey. 
(0.9) 
3 B: Marina del Rey.= 
4 A: =Oh Marina del Re: Iy. 
5 B: [Yah. 
Cases like this are apparently common, while curiously, as Heritage (2007) 
notes, real demonstrations of understanding of the kind shown in the 
made-up Pacific Palisades example are rare (hence the need to fabricate 
them). Why do people avoid demonstrating their understanding in favor 
II I focus here on the creative vector of indexicality (Silverstein 1976). where knowledge of 
the matter creates the possibility of expounding on it. Conversely. we could focus on a 
presupposing vector, where my expounding on it is a way of indicating (or perhaps merely 
claiming) my earlier learning experience(s). 
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of the weaker stance of merely claiming it? There are at least two reasons. 
First, as John Heritage points out (pers. comm.), a full demonstration of 
one's understanding goes against a preference for progressivity (Stivers and 
Robinson 2006), in that it is likely to open up a new sequence, however 
minimal, thereby risking delaying or completely derailing the trajectory 
of talk. To avoid this, a recipient might imply understanding with a con-
tinuer like "uh-huh", and in this way give the go-ahead without disrupt-
ing the speaker's current trajectory. But note how in the Marina del Rey 
example, the speaker does in fact risk a disruption to progrcssivity (here 
eliciting from the speaker a further confirmation "Yah"), yet still without 
using that opportunity to definitively display recognition. It could still be 
that Speaker A in the example doesn't recognize the name of the place or 
doesn't know where it is. This points to a second reason why a mere claim 
to understanding may be preferable to a full demonstration. To positively 
demonstrate my understanding by going beyond what was said earlier is 
at risk of being disaffiliative because it draws attention to the possibility 
that I didn't in fact know it (i.e., why did I need to demonstrate it?). and 
through this to the possibility that you might have thought I didn·t know 
it. Showing that I don't feel the need to "prove'· that I know something is a 
sign that I expect to be trusted by the other, or indeed that the other knows 
what I know (Enfield 2006), and is thereby in itself an expression of trust. 
Going out of my way to prove that I know it risks drawing attention to 
these asymmetries, something that can quickly get an interactional trajec-
tory wobbling into turbulence. 
While Pacific Palisades examples appear to be rare, they do exist. In the 
following case from a telephone call (Heritage 2007: 271; transcription sim-
plified here), Marsha has initially not recognized the voice of Ron, an old 
friend of her daughter. (This occurs prior to the segment supplied below.) 
When Ron announces his name in line I, Marsha makes a strong claim 
to recognition in line 2, but it is no more than a claim, particularly in the 
context of her initial failure. 
(6) 
1 RON: This is Ron Mercahno do you remember me? 
2 MAR: Oh for heaven sake Ron Yeah this is Marsha 
3 RON: Marsha right 
What comes next is the less frequently observed demonstration of recogni-
tion, in line 4: 
4 MAR: You're writing for television 
5 RON: Yeah 
6 MAR: The writing for television Ron 
7 RON: Yeah 
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So far we have examined how knowledge is displayed through either 
claim or demonstration. Now we attend to finer points of distinguishing 
between (relative) degrees of certainty, and matters of how the knowledge 
has been obtained. Suppose we both know that Tamaryn got a phone call 
from her boyfriend's mother, but I was in the room when it happened, 
while you only heard reports of it later. While we are both equally able 
to say that she called, there are two reasons why I am better qualified to 
say it: (l) my knowledge is on firmer ground than yours: because I was 
present I am more certain than you that it is a fact - that is, I have better 
evidence than you and so I am more likely to be telling the truth despite 
the fact that we may both be speaking in good faith; and (2) because I 
directly witnessed the event I can say more things about it, such as how 
long the call went on for, how Tamaryn responded and so on. We thus 
distinguish two components of our knowledge of a proposition: access, 
that is, our source of information and thus our citable reasons for being 
committed to the truth of it; and authority, our capacity to demonstrate 
the effects of knowing that information, through the dispositions enabled 
by whatever access we have had. (Access leads to the knowledge; authority 
leads from it.) 
It is evidently a matter of concern to people that their degree of knowl-
edge, and grounds for knowledge, be made public by means of various 
kinds of marking, implicit and explicit. If I am less certain of the truth 
of a proposition (or wish to claim this for some communicative purpose), 
I may feel the need to hedge, as in "~I think she called once" or "Maybe she 
called once." I may make explicit reference to my source of evidence, as in 
"/ heard that she called once," as is grammatically coded in many languages 
by systems of evidentiality that obligatorily mark whether I perceived 
something myself, whether I have it on hearsay alone, etc. (Aikhenvald 
2004). Such marking appears to be primarily or literally concerned with 
first-order absolute knowledge, that is, the relation between the speaker 
and the content of the proposition. 
Based on the preceding discussion, it is useful to introduce a termino-
logical distinction here, between source-based authority and status-based 
authority. 
Source-based authority concerns actual experience and what it enables. 
If I was present when Tamaryn took the caB from her boyfriend's mother, 
then I can cite this direct experience in support of my commitment to 
knowing it. This notion of access is a backward-looking basis for commit-
ment, pointing back to what gave rise to the knowledge. The authority in 
question concerns that which the knowledge makes possible: namely, the 
range of things I can say or do as a result of that knowledge. 
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By contrast, status-based authority concerns not what you actually 
know, but what you should know, or are entitled to know, given your status 
(Drew 1991: 37ff.). Source-based authority and status-based authority are 
typically in alignment, but sometimes they are not, as in the case of the 
mother who spends less time with her children than the nanny does (cf. 
Raymond and Heritage 2006). Concerning the matter of knowledge of the 
children's personality traits, the nanny has higher source-based author-
ity than the mother, while the mother has higher status-based authority. 
Were we to measure authority by means of the capacity to cite experience 
(what gave rise to the relevant knowledge) or the capacity to reason and 
make predictions about the children's behavior (what is enabled by the rel-
evant knowledge), the nanny would win. But by a different mechanism, 
as part of the mother's ascribed status as mother, among her normatively 
defensible entitlements are that she may claim maximal epistemic access 
regarding her children (and therefore higher, or at least not lower, access 
than anyone else). Note that this is not just so by fiat. but is based on the 
genuine expectation that she will have maximally broad experience with 
the children, as a proper result of having fulfilled her responsibility (as also 
defined by her status as mother) to spend maximal time with the children. 
The nanny example deals precisely with this mismatch. When the nanny 
demonstrates better authority of the mother's children than does the 
mother herself, this reveals that the mother displays diminished (less than 
maximal) source-based knowledge with regard to her own children. The 
core of the problem is that this demonstrates that the mother has not fully 
lived up to her responsibilities as given by her ascribed status as mother. It 
draws attention to her shortcomings as a mother, and, in effect, draws her 
status as mother into moral question. It is no wonder such misalignments 
are fraught. 
Heritage and Raymond (2005) explore the difficulties that arise when 
two speakers pursue a symmetrical goal of agreement on the applicability 
of a proposition to a known state of affairs, but where these speakers find 
themselves having to navigate the asymmetries introduced by status and 
enchrony. Their illustrative case is from a conversation between two friends, 
Jenny and Vera, who agree that Vera's grandchildren make up a lovely 
family (2005: 20). Heritage and Raymond introduce a notation for rep-
resenting knowledge or epistemic commitment. In their shorthand, "K + ,. 
with reference to Speaker A is not absolute but relative, meaning "K + for 
A and K - for B." This introduces four extreme possibilities (though 
Heritage and Raymond only specify two) where both A and B may have 
a value of either K-Iow or K-high. When both A and B are low. or when 
both are high, these appear to be symmetrical situations (though I argue in 
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the following section that this can never really be so, due to inherent asym-
metries of speech act agency). Possibilities other than the two identified by 
Heritage and Raymond are conceivable: Ns knowledge is more than B's 
("K +" in relative terms), but still it's quite low (i.e., approaching "K -" in 
absolute terms). We can imagine that in some situations it is important to 
mark one's degree or kind of absolute knowledge, while in other situations 
it is the relative knowledge that matters. The distinction needs to be made 
and maintained (see Hayano this volume). 
I noted above that knowledge can be explicitly marked. But it is also 
implicitly marked. Commonly, a proposition coded as a bare assertion 
(e.g., "She called once") will be taken to convey the strongest possible epis-
temic commitment, namely "I know for a fact it is true" (Grice 1989). In a 
bare assertion in English, this maximal epistemic commitment is implied 
rather than coded. To code this one would need to make it explicit, as in 
I know that she called once. This sounds overwrought, and defensive, as 
if it had been suggested that you didn't know whether it was the case. But 
everyday statements are backed by the everyday assumption that a speaker 
has adequate evidence for what she is saying (Grice 1989; Pomerantz 
1984b). If anything less than full commitment is intended, this should be 
explicitly marked. As mentioned in Sidnell's chapter on English (in this 
volume), when we preface a proposition with I think, this implies "I don't 
know it," or - perhaps better - "I don't want to say that I know it." 
Note in addition the way that relative knowledge is also implied in fun-
damental ways through the presuppositions that are inherent in speech act 
types (Searle 1969). Declarative forms - as in She called once - imply not 
just "I know it," but also "You don't." This is one reason that "assess-
ments" (Goodwin and Goodwin 1987; Pomerantz 1984a) - as in Adeline's 
such a swell gal - are problematic in epistemic terms: their packaging is 
fitted to a strong asymmetry in knowledge (i.e., in declarative format, they 
are ostensibly "telling" the addressee something), yet their function is often 
aimed at full symmetry, i.e., securing agreement (Heritage and Raymond 
2005). 
In this section I have concentrated on a particular mode of status within 
the domain of epistemic commitment to the content of propositions. As 
we have seen, the fact that using language includes the encoding of propo-
sitions raises a rich set of issues for social interaction. First, there is the 
matter of access: our source of knowledge, the evidence we have for it, 
how we acquired it. Second, relatedly, there is the matter of authority: the 
enablements this access to knowledge brings, such as the capacity to dem-
onstrate our knowledge through reasoning (a capacity of the same kind 
Ryle offered as evidence for mastery in chess or marksmanship). An indi-
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vidual's knowledge is grounded in access, and is measured by authority. 
But there is another, parallel basis for a claim to epistemic commitment, 
namely one's normative rights to certain kinds of knowledge, based on 
status. If I hold the title of chess champion of South Gelderland, I may 
have some claim to speak with authority about chess, even if I am not all 
that good a player and was merely lucky to have won (or cheated). And 
you may even find yourself biting your tongue out of deference to this 
claim, even when you are certain that what I say about chess is dubious 
(just as a nanny may find herself doing when a mother is wrong about 
her own children, or as a student may find herself doing when a lecturer 
is wrong about his topic). Thus we distinguish between source-based and 
status-based authority. We then saw that these nearly parallel modes of 
commitment to knowledge are further relativized across participants in 
an interaction: one person may always be regarded as higher or lower 
than another, based on source-based authority, or a status-related claim to 
such authority. It appears that a status-based claim trumps a source-based 
demonstration when the two are in conflict. This is a paradoxical fact, if 
true, but perhaps not unexpected given that we are not so much rational 
as moral animals. 
Agency 
Our account began by grounding human communicative practice in 
enchrony - a generic mechanism that yields sequence, relevance and 
accountability ~ then relativizing this through the notion of status to 
culturally determined and locally contextual types of social relation, and 
finally focusing on the nature of knowledge as a species of status relat-
ing to states of affairs and the things we can say about them. The previ-
ous section introduced some ways in which speakers and hearers stand in 
relation to knowledge of propositions and responsibility for the formal 
expressive (e.g., grammatical) packaging of that knowledge, and how this 
interacts with respective status beyond speech act participation and into 
social-cultural categories. We must now introduce a fourth piece of con-
ceptual apparatus in order to fully account for the matters of knowledge. 
responsibility and affiliation explored in this book. Status alone is not suf-
ficient to account for some of the empirical data that previous work has 
introduced. We are missing a final source of asymmetry that interacts with 
enchrony, status and knowledge ~ namely, agency. 
The term "agency" has been so widely applied that it may be wise not to 
use it at all. Mostly in this chapter I am referring to the elements of "speak-
erhood" by which a person may have more or less control over various 
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dimensions of an utterance (Goffman 1981). However, I cannot use the 
term "speakerhood" here because I want to generalize beyond speech. I am 
trying to capture the type and degree of control and responsibility a person 
may have with respect to their design of communicative actions and other 
kinds of signs. 
There is no scale by which we may say that a person's agency in com-
munication is simply higher or lower. Instead, agency has multiple distinct 
components that may be addressed separately. Agency may be distributed 
across individuals. This introduces an ever-present potential source of 
asymmetry, logically distinct from the asymmetries inherent to enchrony 
and status. The compound notion of agency assumed here is akin to 
Goffman's disassembly of the agent of any speech act into three: animator, 
author and principal. 
Roughly, the three elements of agency can be characterized as follows. 12 
First, with respect to any behavior, such as the production of a percepti-
ble sign, somebody will control the behavior to a greater or lesser extent. 
That is, they control the physical execution of the sign such that it can be 
perceived and attended to by another. Second, somebody will compose the 
behavior, selecting and planning what its form should be so as to bring 
about the projected effect. Third, somebody will commit to the behavior, 
taking responsibility for its causes and effects, including the appropriate-
ness of its execution in a specific context. In Goffman's terms, who con-
trols the production of the message is its animator; who composes the 
form of the message is its author; and who is responsible for the effects of 
the message is its principal (though see Kockelman [2007: 379, fn. 5] for 
problems with Gotfman's "principal"). 
Goffman made the point that, while the three components of agency in 
speaking tend to be aligned, they are in fact separable, as shown by exam-
ples like the police spokesman who reads a prewritten message (animator, 
but neither author nor principal), or the head of state who delivers a policy 
speech scribed by an advisor (animator and principal, but not author). 
But, normally, each of the three elements of agency in speakerhood is 
embodied in one and the same person. If a man remarks to his wife, "That 
dress really suits you," she will know through direct perception that he is 
the animator of this utterance, and she should normally assume that he 
composed the specific expression of it, and that he takes responsibility for 
what it expresses and for the effects it may have. When a listener applies this 
12 The present account draws on Kockelman's (2007) account of agency, which is directly 
grounded in a more general semiotic theory, after Peirce. I leave aside here the complexi-
ties of possible finer interpretations of the Golfmanian scheme (Hanks 1996; Irvine 1996; 
Levinson 1988; Sidne1l2009). 
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?rdina~ presumption of alignment of the three dimensions of agency, she 
IS applYIng an agent unity heuristic. 13 
Note the inherent difference in access that we have to the three compo-
nents of agency. We typically have direct access to animatorship, because 
we have to be present to perceive the production of an utterance. But we 
don't typically have direct access to the process of authorship (usually 
carried out privately, that is, mentally),14 nor necessarily to the conditions 
of responsibility and commitment that define a principal (though these are 
sometimes publicly available through standard signs of status: e.g., accent, 
clothing, physical features). It is because of the agent unity heuristic that 
we need special devices to mark when agency is distributed. This heuristic 
is a powerful one, and if we want a hearer to suspend her standard applica-
tion of it, formal means are required to signal this. These include signals of 
quoted speech, contextualization cues, etc. 
To illustrate why agency, and in particular the agent unity heuristic, 
is necessary in the present account, consider the study by Heritage and 
Raymond (2005: 34). The authors present data from conversation in 
English in support of the argument that "assessing a referent state of 
affairs in first position implies a claim of primary epistemic and/or moral 
rights to assess that state." Here is how they summarize their findings. 
In sequences of interaction, first position assessments establish a representa-
tional field in which second assessments will be found to position themselves 
in some fashion: through agreement, disagreement, or adjustment (Heritage 
2002a; Pomerantz 1984a). In this sense, first position assessments offer a terrain 
within which agreement will be sought. We propose that these assessments also 
carry an implied claim that the speaker has primary rights to evaluate the matter 
assessed. For example. as we demonstrate, persons offering first assessments may 
work to defeat any implication that they are claiming primary rights to evalu-
ate the matter at hand. Conversely, persons who find themselves producing a 
responsive assessment may wish to defeat the implication that their rights in the 
matter are secondary to those of a first speaker. Because assessments are always 
produced in real time and are unavoidably produced as first and second posi-
tioned actions, they bring unavoidable relevance to issues concerning relative 
epistemic rights to evaluate states of affairs. (Heritage and Raymond 2005: 16) 
13 "Heuristic" here refers to an interpretive strategy that applies a simple rule of thumb in 
order to simplify what might otherwise be a complex decision-making process (Gigercnzer 
2007). For example. in selecting which brand of soap powder to buy. I simply buy the same 
one I've used before. rather than testing out every new brand that comes along to deter-
mine whether it's better or worse on some measure. 
14 The psychological process of utterance production can be partially made publi~ through 
visible indices such as hand gestures (Beattie 2003: McNeill 1985.2005: d. Enfield 2009. 
and references therein). 
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The account is grounded in the observation that first position implies 
primary rights. Why might this be so? First, as Heritage and Raymond 
make clear, enchrony is what underlies the inevitability of actions being 
taken as "first" (or initiating) versus "second" (or responsive). But why 
should first position hereby imply primary rights? I want to argue that there 
are three mechanisms, derived from the analytical tools brought together 
here: (l) being the one to say it; (2) saying it in the form of an assertion; 
and (3) saying it independently. (Note that these are matters of control, 
composition, and commitment, respectively.) Let us consider these in turn. 
How does an agent unity heuristic contribute to the effects described by 
Heritage and Raymond? I want to argue the following. When you hear and 
see me speak, it is directly apparent that I, and only I, am animator of the 
message. Applying the agent unity heuristic, that is, using the most accessi-
ble component of agenthood - control or animatorship - to infer the least 
accessible - commitment or principalhood - the normal assumption will 
be that if I and only I am animator of the message, then I am also author 
and principal of the message. This is an animator bias. IS The issue here is 
that animating is typically strongly asymmetrical: the tendency is for one 
person to speak at a time (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974; Stivers et al. 
2009), certain classes of departure notwithstanding (e.g., Lerner 2002). Via 
the agent unity heuristic this asymmetry is automatically imported to the 
domain of commitment or principalhood. But in the kinds of interactional 
contexts in which interlocutors strive to build affiliation through the overt 
expression of agreement, the goal is symmetry of commitment. 
In terms of the basic social motives for communication discussed by 
Tomasello (2008), the problem here is that a structure designed for inform-
ing is being used for the function of sharing. This may be a kind of exa-
ptation, a panda's thumb of language use. Along lines argued by Marcus 
(2008; cf. Jackendoff 1997: 20), the system has the klunky quality typical of 
evolved systems that must constantly come up with ad hoc solutions engi-
neered out of structures which are available but which may have initially 
evolved for other functions. One of Marcus's examples is the human spine, 
evolved to maintain a horizontal position from which the body weight 
hangs down (cf. other mammals), but which now has to hold our weight 
vertically, something for which it is not well designed at all. There is an ill 
fit between the source structure and its target function. Similarly, part of 
the problem documented by Heritage and Raymond is an ill fit between 
the asymmetry of animatorship in speaking and the intended symmetry of 
principalhood in agreeing. But there is more. 
15 Shooting the messenger is a kind of collateral damage owed to the agent unity heuristic - i.e., 
where the one who is merely animator pays the consequences of being treated as principal. 
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As noted already, the speech act of assertion itself carries with it the 
presupposition of an epistemic gradient in which "I know it, you don't." 
When we make assessments like "They're a lovely family," we are often 
saying this not to inform someone: rather we are seeking their agreement 
(Heritage and Raymond 2005: 20). Languages provide us with devices for 
explicitly marking that this is what we are doing, such as English tag-type 
strategies ("aren't they?," "don't you think?"), or Lao sentence-final particle-
type strategies (noqJ "agreement-seeking polar question marker" [Enfield 
2007: 48-50]). But even with such marking, the speaker who goes first is 
nevertheless somehow "implying a claim of primary rights to evaluate the 
matter." And there is yet more. 
I have so far proposed that primary rights of the kind described by 
Heritage and Raymond may be implied by (1) being the one to say it (via an 
agent unity heuristic and an animator bias; if the addressee is "not saying 
it" then an implication is that they are also not - yet - committed to it); 
and (2) saying it in the form of an assertion (via the presuppositions of 
that speech act, namely that the addressee is unknowing). Now we want to 
know why "saying itjirst" also conspires to imply primary rights to what 
is said. As Heritage and Raymond show, the problem is not solved simply 
by the addressee saying it too, in second position. Thanks to enchrony, an 
asymmetry still applies. To see why, we need a distinction between speech 
event and narrated event, introduced by Jakobson (1971) for dealing with 
matters of deixis. 
The speech event is the actual situation of speaking, in which the par-
ticipants find themselves. It is the proximal realm of reference for words 
like "I," "here" and "now." The narrated event (or, more accurately, the 
narrated state of affairs, since it is not always an event) is the state of 
affairs being talked about. So, if Tamaryn says to Reina She called once, 
the narrated event is the phone call, and the speech event is the conversa-
tion between Tamaryn and Reina (and Sandra).16 Note that the speech 
event is the true realm of enchrony, where relations between communica-
tive actions show effectiveness and appropriateness, regulated by the status 
of speech act participants. And with regard to knowledge, absolute knowl-
edge is calculated with reference to the narrated event (how sure one is that 
"She called once"), while relative knowledge is calculated with reference to 
the speech event, in addition (how much more sure one is than someone 
else that "she called once"). 
16 Sometimes of course, the speech event is the narrated event, or there may be a speech event 
within the ~arrated event (in which case words like 'T' may have transformed reference, as 
in John said "I quit," where ''I'' no longer refers to the actual animator of the utterance). 
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Now, if I make an assertion like They're a lovely family, not only do I 
display a certain epistemic commitment to the proposition in the narrated 
event ("I know it"), but also 1 display a commitment to the appropriateness 
and effectiveness of expressing this proposition as an utterance that contrib-
utes to this speech event here and now. In this way I may be held accountable 
for not one thing but two: (1) that I am committed to the content of what 
I say; and (2) that I am committed to the appropriateness of saying it here 
and now. Through this, a "first position assessment" implies a unilateral or 
independent claim of relevance: not only do I know that they're a lovely 
family and therefore have authority to say it, but it was my idea to say it 
in this context (implying: not yours). This is the key problem with going 
second. There is a heavy asymmetry in agency in the speech event con-
cerning the "cause" of my saying it now - i.e., what engendered or occa-
sioned my saying it now. In first position, what causes me to say it is that "1 
wanted to say this, now" (I considered it appropriate), but when 1 respond 
by agreeing with what you just said, I am vulnerable to losing all perceived 
agency in the domain of the speech event: i.e., "I'm only saying this, now, 
because you just said it." 
So there are two problems. One is that, by stating it in first position, I 
invite an implication of priority through an agent unity heuristic and an 
animator bias ([a] that I'm animating it implies that I'm committed to it; 
and [b] that only I am animating it implies that only I am committed to it), 
combined with the inherent pragmatics of formally asserting it ("I know it, 
you don't"). The second problem is that, by stating it in second position, 
you risk being perceived to have uttered it only because the other just did. 
(Or, perhaps better: if you say it in second position, it is possible that you 
would not have otherwise said it; if you say it in first position, well, you 
did say it.) The kinds of strategies for upgrading in second position that 
Heritage and Raymond (2005) describe are precisely designed to defeat 
these implications (cf. Heritage 2002a). 
Consider a situation in which a speaker finds himself saying something 
that may be interpreted as merely occasioned by what the other has just 
said. In line 1 of the extract below, Jess asks Mike if he's "boxing right 
now" - that is, if he's currently training for a fight. 
(7) 
1 JESS: Are you bgxing right now? 
2 (0.9) 
3 MIKE: I'm gonna start tod"ay. 
4 (.) 
5 JESS: rOh:. 
6 MIKE: [Tonight actually tuh tell ya thuh tru:th, 
7 (0.3) 
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8 MIKE: Six fiftee:n. 
9 (0.7) 
10 JESS: At thuh place on St.!!.:te Street? 
I I MIKE: >St.!!.te Street. < 
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When Mike responds after nearly a second by saying ''I'm gonna start 
today", it sounds like he might be opportunistically affirming in response 
to Jess's question. After all, since he's not in training yet, a "no" response 
is equally fitting. Instead he claims that he is going to start today, but he 
does not give evidence to demonstrate that this was already his intention. 
No doubt Mike doesn't want it to sound like his announcement in line 3 
is only occasioned by her asking, which is consistent with what he does 
then go on to say: in lines 6-8 he is increasingly more specific about the 
time of starting (from "today" to "tonight" to "six fifteen"), as an offer of 
independent evidence that he was already planning to begin today, and not 
because she just asked. 
Conclusion 
My objective is a general account of how communicative actions are inter-
preted, as a function of (I) their context in a sequence of communicative 
actions, (2) the relative status of the interlocutors involved, including (3) 
differences in source and authority regarding knowledge about states of 
affairs being referred to (or otherwise relevant) and (4) the distribution of 
agency and its features. Taken together these are elements of a framework 
that is general enough to capture phenomena we already need to capture 
(e.g., sequence organization, deictic reference, pragmatic implicature), but 
also able to account for the specific concerns of this book: the complexi-
ties of knowledge, responsibility and affiliation. Let me summarize the 
argument. 
Enchrony. Communication involves sequences of communicative 
actions in social interaction, where relevance drives interpretation at 
every step. This interpretation is normatively guided insofar as commu-
nicative actions may be seen as more or less effective of the responses 
they elicit, and responses may be seen as more or less appropriate to 
the actions they respond to. Enchrony introduces two critical elements 
of an account for moral responsibility in the communication of in/or-
mation: (1) sequential asymmetry and the literal primacy of "going 
first"; (2) the potential for normative regimentation of relevance rela-
tions via appropriateness and effectiveness. 
II Status. The normative structure of interactional sequence is relativ-
ized to categories of human relation, defined by cultural and activity 
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contexts. The notions of appropriateness and effectiveness are thus 
transformed into normative context- and person-specific entitlements 
and responsibilities, which may be morally governed. Depending on 
the status categories a person enacts at a given moment, he will be 
accountable for his behavior as measured against his associated rights 
and duties. The relevant categories of status include social roles from 
mother and brother to police officer and teacher to speaker and hearer: 
in all cases, there is an "official" sense of what a person should and 
should not do (or be capable of doing), and an "actual" sense of what 
they will or will not be capable of doing. 
III Knowledge. Because human communication includes the coding of 
information in the form of propositions, this introduces a range of 
issues concerning entitlements and responsibilities relating to knowl-
edge encoded in a proposition. A first-order way of analyzing this 
knowledge concerns an individual's relation to the information. What 
they know is a direct result of how they know it: that is, their access to 
the state of affairs. This may be measured by their authority in dem-
onstrating this knowledge. Distinct from this capacity to demonstrate 
knowledge, based on real access, there is a parallel but distinct claim 
to authority based on status - e.g., a grandmother should know her 
own grandchildren very well, even if in fact someone else can demon-
strate knowledge of them that is as good or better. At a second order 
there is the matter of relative knowledge - that is, the relation between 
the type and degree of knowledge of two speech act participants. All 
things being equal, a grandmother knows her grandchildren better 
than her friend does, but not as well as her own daughter does - the 
children's mother. Some ways in which epistemic commitment is for-
mally marked (e.g., in speech) are concerned with absolute knowledge, 
others concern relative knowledge, yet others are more general. l7 Some 
marking is explicit, some implicit. Generally speaking, given the sta-
tuses and degrees and types of commitment that pertain in a situation, 
speakers should represent them as accurately as possible, because they 
are at any point liable to be held accountable - which shouldn't be a 
problem so long as their strategies of coding are aligned with the facts. 
Turbulence arises when the many sources of asymmetry fail to align. 
IV Agency. A final source of asymmetry in communication concerns the 
distinctness of the three components of agency. There is an animator 
17 Though as Kobin Kendrick stresses (pers. cornm.). even those "absolute" markers are used 
relatively in that they are deployed in ways that orient to the epistemic state of the inter-
locutor. It may be that the distinction made here between absolute and relative can be more 
accurately characterized as a cline from the most (explicitly) relative to the least (explicitly) 
relative. 
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bias due to animatorship being the most accessible of the three com-
ponents of agency: thus, if someone is an animator, we assume that 
they are also author and principal, unless there is evidence otherwise. 
But animating is inherently more strongly asymmetrical than commit-
ment or principalhood. The whole point of building agreement and 
affiliation is in a sense to build a "compound principal" consisting of 
two or more people in relation to a proposition. The fact that conversa-
tion is built around taking turns at unilaterally animating seems to be 
in direct conflict with this goal. Three mechanisms are at play. First. 
when you are the one to say it, the other person is thereby not the one 
to say it, and, through an agent unity heuristic. they also are at risk of 
being implied to be "not committed to it" either. Second. when you say 
it in the form of an assertion, this implies that the other is unknowing. 
Third, when you sa)' it first, you say it independently. with the agency 
of having spoken unprompted and having seen it as being appropri-
ate in the context, rendering any direct agreement by the other at risk 
of being taken as mere following. These asymmetries are grounded in 
enchrony and agency and they become problematic when they are not 
aligned with the asymmetries of status and knowledge. 
Language use is a complex affair, in which propositions with complex 
forms of coding are expressed and deployed on an undercarriage that 
shares much with other species - that is, a communicative system whose 
primary function is to achieve social goals through interaction. Our system 
is transformed, however, not only by the complexities of language. but 
by something else that is unique to our species: pro-social cooperative 
motives and the moral policing that is necessary to keep a cooperative 
system going. Facts about human interaction of the kind recorded in the 
above chapters show that everyday interaction is beset with the difficul-
ties of reconciling a large set of informational and social-relational asym-
metries in communication. Why should we experience these difficulties? 
After all. we are well-practiced users of the communicative systems at our 
disposal. I suspect that we are doing the best we can with an inherently 
imperfect system. Problems of the kind described above. where proper-
ties of the system produce these clashes. are a necessary outcome of the 
kluge-like nature of the system as an evolved system (Jacob 1977: Marcus 
2008). A recent account of the evolutionary origins of human communica-
tion proposes a path of development of social motives for communication. 
going from requesting to helping/informing to sharing (Tomasello 2008). 
The core of the problem examined in this book is a conflict between the 
unalike gradients inherent in these three communicative functions - for 
instance, as discussed above, there is an inherent imbalance in employing 
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an assertive grammatical format (ostensibly for informing) in utterances 
whose core goal appears to be sharing. If our communicative system is a 
truly evolved one, then these are precisely the kind of kluge-like imperfec-
tions we would expect to have to work around. Sources of asymmetry in 
the very fabric of the system give us no time out from the moral dilemmas 
of social interaction. 
